

STRATEGISING IN A HYPERTURBULENT AND HYPERFLUID WORLD: A LOST CAUSE?

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Purpose: The viability of strategising under conditions of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity has become a strong bone of contention. Can strategising be feasible and appropriate; create synergy and coherence; and be sustainable under such conditions? The aim of this paper is to propose reinvention requirements for strategising and to propose an overall strategising approach based on these requirements.

Design/ Methodology/ Approach: The main thrust of the paper is to discuss five interdependent re-invention requirements for a strategising approach more suitable to hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity. Each of the five requirements seeks to address one or more of the criteria (e.g. feasibility, appropriateness, synergy) that strategising must meet in order to be a viable endeavour under the above conditions.

Findings: Based on the discussion of these re-invention requirements, a revised overall strategising approach is proposed. The suggested approach centers around ensuring sustainable future value-adding for stakeholders; requires an enabling change navigation strategy and plan; the performance of the full repertoire of strategising acts; the execution of the strategising process itself; and a conducive strategising context.

Implications: The paper offers an integrated, comprehensive reinvented strategising approach which is believed will contribute towards the continued viability of strategising under conditions of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity, given strategising's increasingly critical role under these conditions.

Originality/ Value: The proposed requirements for re-invented strategising, and the suggested overall strategising approach based on these requirements, integrate not only what currently is treated as separate discourses in the strategic literature, but also reframe and/or combine this literature with the latest thinking regarding the nature and dynamics of the reality which needs to be strategised about and be transformed, e.g. complexity/chaos theory and change navigation. In this way, a fresh perspective is taken on strategising.

Key words and phrases: Strategising process, Strategising outcomes, Strategising requirements, Change navigation

INTRODUCTION

Strategising encompasses the set of coherent actions chosen and taken by an organisation's leadership community to realise the most desirable future regarding the identity, positioning and direction of their organisation in order to ensure sustainable future value-adding and wealth creation for stakeholders. The chosen, future driven actions will change the character, functioning, performance, and/or trajectory of their organisation relative to the future desired value-adding and wealth creation (Barlett & Ghosal, 1994:79-88; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998:3-24; Ferrier, 2001:858-877; Harvey & Buckley, 2002:368-378; Hill & Jones, 2001; Lissack & Roos, 2001:53-70; Robert, 2004; Ungerer, Pretorius & Herholdt, 2002:1-38 and Veldsman, 2002:36-37).

This description of strategising triggers at least five questions regarding the minimum conditions for strategising to be a viable endeavour:

- *Feasibility.* Is it possible in the world in which organisations operate, now and the future, to build, implement and persevere with a chosen strategy (Mintzberg, 1994)? The emerging world is one of accelerating change, growing diversity, deepening ambiguity, increasing complexity, heightened interdependency, and widening seamlessness which appear to make strategising an exercise in futility (Veldsman, 2002). How can one think and talk about the future when everything regarding the future appears to be in flux and uncertain?
- *Appropriateness.* Can an appropriate set of strategic actions be identified under these fluid and unpredictable conditions where answers, but even more so questions, have become questionable? Conventional wisdoms no longer apply; the future has become much more open-ended; discontinuity and serendipity rather than extrapolation and well-considered actions rule;

and the science of the probable has turned into the art of the impossible (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998).

- *Synergy*. Is it at all possible under such conditions of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity to arrive at and persist with a set of coherent actions that are mutually supportive and create strategic synergy over the longer term (Camillus, 1999:3-16 and Porter, 1996)? This question relates to the alignment of strategising *within* itself, the “hanging together” of strategic actions.
- *Coherence*. Can the organisation as a total entity be held together over time as strategic actions have to be chosen and executed at an increasing rate with more radical and fundamental impacts on the organisation? At issue in this case is alignment *across and within* the organisational landscape as strategising endeavours to transform the landscape (Courteney, Kirkland & Viguerie, 1997:67-79).
- *Sustainability*. Can genuine change with long term, demonstrable value-adding be attained under conditions of hyperturbulence where virtually everything is in flux? Or can one at most hope for transitory successes and fleeting, piece-meal value-adds (Hill & Jones, 2001)?

Do the above questions, encompassing the minimum conditions for sound strategising, not indicate that formal systematic, rational and comprehensive strategising is a lost cause, futile in its intentions and results (Campbell & Alexander, 1997:42-51; Mintzberg, 1994 and Styhre, 2002:577-587)? Especially if one considers the tentative, best estimate answers given of “Yes, but”; “Perhaps”; “Probable”; “May be” under the prevailing fluid conditions. Must organisations not rather muddle through; fly by the seats of their pants; and become on-the-spur-of-the-moment, knee jerk opportunists? Should tactical-operational opportunities, challenges and issues not take precedence, and strategising not be seen as an unaffordable luxury which takes one’s eye off the here-and-now, pressing issues which require most attention and energy (Huffman, 2001:13-20)? These attitudes are worsened if strategic fatigue is also infecting an organisation (Beinhocker & Kaplan, 2002:1-6).

As has been stated above, strategising is about securing sustainable future value-adding and wealth creation for an organisation within a certain future referenced setting and timeframe. If the leadership community of an organisation does not consider the future, their organisation will not have a future, especially if that future is going to look radically different. It thus can be argued that under conditions of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity, the leadership community of organisations paradoxically cannot spend less time debating their future, however demanding the here-and-now may be and however uncertain the future may be. They should rather spend more time thinking and talking about the future if they wish to be architects instead of victims of their future. Indeed, the white waters of hyperturbulence makes it imperative for strategising to be given an even more central role within the organisational landscape, and not to be relegated to the organisational junkyard of discarded, abortive practices, unfulfilled intentions, or wishful thinking (Hamel, 2003:69-82).

The purpose of this paper is to argue that, because the future will look different and organisations in identity, positioning and operations therefore need to look and act differently in that future, strategising similarly has to reinvent itself to become more effective within this different future and transformed/transforming organisations.

FIVE, INTERDEPENDENT REINVENTION REQUIREMENTS FOR STRATEGISING

One of the reasons for the emerging strategic fatigue in organisations may be that strategising itself has not kept pace with the accelerating changes which necessitate a reinvention of strategising itself. Strategising itself thus has fallen behind in reinventing itself (Camillus, 1999:3-16; Courtney, Kirkland & Viguerie, 1997:67-79; Mintzberg, 1994; Harvey & Buckley, 2002:368-378; Strickland, 2003:10-12 and Styhre, 2002:577-587). Organisations still pursuing conventional strategising thus will find it a lost cause and increasingly suffer from the paralysing virus of strategic fatigue. This fatigue typically manifests itself in a relapse into an exclusively sole focus on tactical-operational decisions and actions. Organisations able and willing to reinvent their strategising to be appropriate to hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity, however, will find it an indispensable means to navigate the vortex of uncertainty, unpredictability and ambiguity.

Five interdependent, reinvention requirements for strategising are proposed and discussed in this paper:

- applying a complete repertoire of strategising acts;
- architecting a “fit-for-purpose” strategising logic;
- charting a strategic map to direct and guide the organisation into the future;
- viewing strategising and change navigation as two sides of the same coin; and
- making strategising an everyday, ongoing, living reality in the organisation.

Each of the above reinvention requirements seeks to address at least one of the minimum requirements discussed above (e.g. feasibility, appropriateness) to make strategising a viable endeavor. Each requirement is discussed in turn, where-after an overall strategising approach incorporating these reinvention requirements is proposed.


REINVENTION REQUIREMENT 1: APPLYING A COMPLETE REPERTOIRE OF STRATEGISING ACTS

Strategising conducted within the white waters of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity is bound to fail if the emphasis is predominantly (or even exclusively) on the once-off strategising act of direction setting only (i.e. the highly revered ritual of the annual strategy planning indaba); makes a linear extrapolation from the present into the future based on the premise of a complete understanding of such a future attained through comprehensive and detailed analysis; uses a command and control style to extract unquestionable subservience from subordinates in implementing the strategy; and adopts a rigid project/programmatic strategic roll out approach with the logical sequencing of steps/tasks/activities against a set timetable.

Strategising under hyperturbulent and hyperfluid conditions can only be feasible if it consists of the full repertoire of four interdependent, iterative and interactive strategising acts which carry equal weight and receive equal attention during strategising, namely the acts of (1) exploration and direction setting; (2) bonding and moulding; (3) navigation and steering; as well as (4) tracking and valuation. This repertoire of strategising acts revolves dynamically around the intended outcome, a strategic map (to be discussed later) which charts the strategic journey towards the desired future.

Already in the terms used, one can detect a different flavour in contrast to conventional strategising. Hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity require intensive reconnoitering and dialogue in order to explore and discover probable and possible futures before adopting a desirable future to pursue, with a subsequent ongoing dialogue around the chosen future as it unfolds in the organisational landscape (Camillus, 1999:3-16 and Hamel, 1996:69-82, 2003:404-433, 2004:6-14); a strong, lasting bonding and moulding of all stakeholders into a truly committed action community who are focused on and energised towards this shared desirable future, and simultaneously are enabled and empowered to move decisively within their respective domains of actions as they collectively undertake the shared journey towards future actualisation (Bartlett & Ghosal, 1994:79-88 and Pascale, 1999:83-94); navigating and steering flexibly and responsively across the ever changing and shifting organisational landscape towards the desired future destination, discovering, crafting and learning different and new paths along the way whilst undertaking the journey (Ferrier, 2001:858-877; Hill & Jones, 2001 and Pascale, 1999:83-94); and the ongoing tracking and valuation of future actualisation in terms of value unlocking and wealth creation as the journey unfolds, and making course adjustments in light of the tracking and valuation. According to Figure 1, the complexity factors within which the organisation has to operate sets the context for the strategising acts, whereas the reality perspective (e.g. interconnected whole, patterns) informs the nature of the reality these acts have to engage with. The strategising acts form an interacting, systemic whole.

Figure 1: A full repertoire of strategising acts




REINVENTION REQUIREMENT 2: ARCHITECTING A “FIT-FOR-PURPOSE” STRATEGISING LOGIC

The repertoire of four strategising acts reflected in Figure 1 is joined together by an explicit, overt or implicit, covert strategising logic: a chosen way of linking and performing the strategising acts. The arrows in Figure 1 that tie the strategising acts together in a dynamic whole, graphically represent this logic. By implication, this logic can take different forms depending on the choices made by leadership regarding the way of doing strategising. These choices can enable or disable an organisation’s strategising competence. Most organisations do not deliberately and critically reflect on their strategising logic, and assess its appropriateness. Put differently, they do not strategise about their strategising process. Their strategising logic is mostly a manifestation of conventional wisdom, fads and fashions, personal idiosyncrasies, and/or accepted past/current practices followed within the organisation.

The hyperturbulent and hyperfluid setting, however, requires that deliberate and explicit attention be given to the strategising logic adopted by an organisation in order to test whether it is “fit-for-purpose”. The appropriateness of the logic has to be assessed relative to the requisite complexity of the setting in which the organisation has to operate, its unique character, its current dynamics, and its life cycle stage (Courtney, Kirkland & Viguerie, 1997:67-79; Hamel, 1996:69-82 and Styhre, 2002:577-587). There therefore cannot be a “one-size-fits-all” approach to strategising. Figure 2 provides a menu of possible choices regarding strategising, grouped into five domains: the why, what, how, who and where of the strategising logic. These choices are based on the different stances taken to strategising by various strategists.

Figure 2: Strategising logic choices



Adapted from: Beinhocker & Kaplan, 2002; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Camillus, 1999; Grant, 1995; Hamel, 1996; Heracleous, 1998; Hill & Jones, 2001; Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999; Robert, 2004; Thompson, 1999; Volberda & Elfring, 2001a and Veldsman, 2002.

According to Figure 2, opposing strategising choices exist within each of the five domains, e.g. emphasising trends vs scenario's (the what); taking a top down vs bottom up approach (the who); planning vs dialogue (the how); efficiency vs effectiveness (the why); and a local vs global location (the where). Historically, the strategising logic of most, if not all organisations, was crafted from choices found on the left hand side of the domains given in Figure 2 to the detriment of choice to be found on the right hand side of Figure 2. For example: trends (the what); planning, analysis (the how); plan (the why); top down, elitist (the who); and, present-into-the future, a static time horizon (the

where). In the past, this “left brain” strategising logic resolution has been relatively successful in a stable, predictable, simple setting. Or, at least the negative counter effects of such a logic could have been dealt with at a more leisurely pace.

In a turbulent, unpredictable and complex setting, the positive contribution of the “left brain” resolution has inverted to become predominantly a negative, i.e. a disabling strategising logic. At present, many organisations thus are feverishly pursuing an exclusive “right brain” resolution to effective strategising, similarly to organisations that have been pursuing only a “left brain” resolution. For example: scenario’s, journey (the what); synthesis, dialogue (the how); intent (the why); inclusive (the who); and value network (the where).

Thus a binary approach to strategising has been the accepted convention in which either a left or right brain resolution is adopted (Courtney, Kirkland & Viguerie, 1997:67-79 and Styhre, 2002:577-587). What is necessary, however, is not a “left brain” or “right brain” resolution of the opposing choices given in Figure 2, but a dynamic fusion of the opposing poles to arrive at a coherent, “fit-for-purpose” strategising logic appropriate to the unique circumstances faced by the organisation concerned (e.g. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998:241-247; Kurtz & Snowden, 2003:462-483; Sull, 1999:42-52 and Ungerer, Pretorius & Herholott, 2002). For example: considering both the destination and journey (the what); creating understanding and ownership (the who); combining analysis and synthesis (the how); looking for fit and intent (the why); and having static and moving time horizons (the where).

An appropriate, enabling strategising logic hence can only come about if the leadership of an organisation deliberately and explicitly strategises about their strategising, and does so by fusing the opposing strategising choices in a balanced fashion. In this way, a true and enabling competence regarding strategising will be established within the organisation, appropriate to the setting within which strategising has to occur.

REINVENTION REQUIREMENT 3: CHARTING A STRATEGIC MAP TO DIRECT AND GUIDE THE ORGANISATION INTO THE FUTURE

As has been argued, strategising is about a set of coherent future directed actions to bring into being a chosen desirable future. Traditionally, these actions have been cast into a strategic plan with commensurate objectives, goals and action steps, which through tight rational integration is intended to create strategic synergy. The premise is a well-understood, relatively stable strategising landscape that can be traversed by logically, sequenced phases (or steps) using relatively fixed reference points (or milestones) along the way.

Hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity, however, are transforming/has transformed the strategising landscape radically and fundamentally in terms of its nature, dynamics and evolution. Under these conditions, the half-life of the traditional strategic plans has increased exponentially. Rational, linear planning and a plan have become a threatened species. Aspirations, intentions and dreams have moved into the driving seat. Strategising has become more of a messy, uncertain, never-ending journey towards a shifting destination(s) embedded in a strategising landscape that is in a constant state of flux. Fixed, certain beacons within the landscape from which to take bearings have become rare and far between (cf. Ungerer, Pretorius & Herholdt, 2002). Even the composition of the landscape is changing because of the emergence of new features, interdependencies, and dynamics within the landscape.


Instead of the traditional strategic plan, a strategic map is rather required to traverse the strategising landscape (e.g. Huff, 1990 and Thompson, 1999:218-236). The concept “strategic map” conveys more appropriately the sense of an open-ended journey and intended destination across and within a changing landscape, consisting of ongoing choices made by travelers as the journey unfolds, conditions change, learning occurs, insight widens, and wisdom deepens. A strategic map’s aim is to chart synergistically the intended and emerging strategic positioning and posture of an organisation within a strategising landscape in terms of the landscape’s topology (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005: 51-62 and Ungerer, Pretorius & Herholdt, 2002).

The repertoire of strategising acts, with their connecting strategising logic discussed above (see Figures 1 and 2), produces the map which in turn directs and guides strategising as it unfolds, dynamically and organically, within the strategising landscape. The strategic map thus is

simultaneously an input into and an output from strategising. In this way, strategic synergy is created not only in terms of content (i.e., the map relative to the landscape, and vice versa) but also in terms of process (i.e., the strategising acts connected by the chosen strategising logic as the means of building and using the map). Contrary to a conventional map, a strategic map is transformed as it is used because of the changing and shifting landscape, as well as the deeper insight gained through the use of the map, as well as the effect the map has on the landscape. The map hence is created and recreated on an ongoing basis.

A proposed generic map, to be populated by the strategic specifics of an organisation established through strategising, is given in Figure 3. The map has been constructed from the major streams of strategic discourses regarding the strategic landscape's topology (Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999:21-30 and Volberda & Elfring, 2002). The outer edge of the map reflects the strategic parameters (or playing field) of the organisation (i.e. forces for changes, mission, core competencies, competitive edge, vision, core philosophy, and critical performance measures) within which the dynamic strategic elements of the map (the game) of the organisation (i.e. core strategy and strategic initiatives) are embedded and emerge. The components of the strategic map, given in Figure 3, need to be configured into a coherent whole that places an organisation on a certain trajectory as it moves into the future. Hence, the different arrows in Figure 3 depicting the interrelationships, and need for alignment across the strategic map. No single element gives the strategy. The whole map equates to the strategy (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005:51-62 and Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 2002:198-211).

Figure 3: A generic strategic map



Under conditions of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity, the journey through the ever-changing and transforming strategic landscape therefore requires a strategic map to guide and direct an organisation's journey forwards its destination. Such a map synergistically enables an organisation to have a comprehensive but simple, visual picture of its strategic positioning, posture and intentions. Additionally, the map allows an organisation to be responsive and agile within the changing strategic landscape since the map is not static but is transformed and recreated whilst being used.


REINVENTION REQUIREMENT 4: TREATING STRATEGISING AND CHANGE NAVIGATION AS TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN

Strategising, as directed and guided by a strategic map, entails bringing something different and/or new into being within an organisational landscape, whether it is with respect to the character,

functioning, performance, trajectory and/or history of an organisation. These actions, aimed at bringing something different and/or new into being, necessitate making one's chosen future a reality, as reflected in the strategic map. That is, making the future present tense, and the present past tense.

Strategising therefore trades in the currency of three states: the *"To be"* state, i.e. what the organisational landscape must look like in the future when the different/new has become a reality in the organisation; the *"As is"* state, i.e. how the organisational landscape looks at present; and the *"In between"* state, i.e. when an organisational landscape is becoming something different and/or new by converting the *"As is"* into the *"To be"*. Strategising thus incorporates juggling simultaneously the three tenses of past, present and future, and the three states of *"To be"*, *"As is"* and *"In between"* within and across the organisational landscape in a systemic, synchronous and aligned manner as illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Strategising as simultaneously juggling three tenses and states relative to the organisational landscape



The above described three tenses and states form the essential parts of change. In contrast, conventional strategising links the three tenses and states in a linear, extrapolative fashion based on assumptions such as: the future will look very similar to the past and present; future success can be predicated on present success; the *"In between"* state is of little concern because the *"As is"* and *"To be"* states are very similar; and a rational, programmatic approach can be taken to the roll out of the strategic plan (Pettigrew, Woodman & Cameron, 2001:697-713 and Veldsman, 2002:46-71). Change, and its management, hence are seen as lesser components in the roll out of strategy, or at most must be seen as supplementary.

Under conditions of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity, change and change navigation move centre stage. Navigating change successfully emerges as the greatest strategic challenge of all under such conditions (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998:1-24 and Hamel, 2004:6-14). Change navigation indeed becomes the crucial counterpart (or mirror image) of strategising. In some respects, change, strategising, and change navigation (have) become synonymous terms. Within the context of

strategising, change implies transforming and/ or recreating the strategic map in order to change the trajectory of the organisation (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 2002:198-211).

In summary, it has been argued that change, strategising, and change navigation become synonymous terms under conditions of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity. Changes within, and change navigation with respect to the organisational landscape, as well as the organisational landscape itself, have to be viewed significantly differently if strategising is to be successful under these conditions (Pascale, Millemann, & Gioja, 1997:127-139). Strategising relative to the organisational landscape, and the counterpoint of change navigation, have to be seen as an undivided whole which have to be treated in a coherent fashion.

REINVENTION REQUIREMENT 5: MAKING STRATEGISING AN EVERYDAY, ONGOING LIVING REALITY IN THE ORGANISATION

In a hyperturbulent and hyperfluid world, strategising needs to a verb, continuously reframing and permeating all actions and domains of the organisational landscape and its action community. Strategising becomes an essential ingredient of the ongoing rhythm of daily life within the organisational landscape, in this way creating and maintaining sustainable value-adding and wealth creation for stakeholders.


In order for strategising to be a verb, infusing the daily life rhythm within the organisational landscape, a process has to be institutionalised within the organisational landscape that seamlessly connects in real time the macro setting which encapsulates current and future expected big picture changes ("the trends" or scenarios) with the here-and-now operational setting where coal face moments of truth are created through ongoing daily interactions with stakeholders (Beinhocker & Kaplan, 2002:1-6; Hampden-Turner, 1993:327-346; Huffman, 2001 and Pascale, 1999:83-94). It is also within the latter setting that the early clues of shifts in stakeholder needs, expectations and actions emerge, long before they manifest themselves in large picture changes. This seamless process needs to be embedded within the complete repertoire of strategising acts (e.g., discovery, bonding) (see Figure 1) and respective change states (e.g., "To be") (see Figure 4). Only in this way can sustainable future value-add be attained. Such a process is proposed and given in Figure 5.

According to Figure 5, the "Top down" process, connecting the big picture changes to the coal face moments of truth, occurs through the continuous recreation of the strategic map (see Figure 3) aimed at changing the here-and-now operations within the organisational landscape. The process deals with the formalised dimension of strategising, the desired "big leaps" into the future. The "Bottom up" process, linking the operational setting to the macro setting, occurs according to Figure 5 through the daily experiences and responses of stakeholders in their daily interactions with the organisation, which ultimately create or destroy wealth. The "Bottom up" process verifies the validity of the chosen strategic map through real time signals from the coal face of the organisation where the strategic transformation of the organisational landscape, by means of the strategic map and real time experimentation, is unfolding. This process represents incremental shifts or experimental probes into the future (Barlett & Ghosal, 1994:79-88; Camillus, 1999:3-16; Grant, 1995; Hamel, 2004:6-14; Hampden-Turner, 1993:327-346; Hill & Jones, 2001 and Kanter, 2002:76-81).

The "Bottom up" process also surfaces early signals from the operational setting regarding trend shifts and/or breaks, e.g. shifts in client product/service preferences. The "Bottom up" process represents the emerging strategising dimension, which in turn feeds into the top down, formalised strategising process (Kanter, 2002:76-81 and Mintzberg, 1994), ensuring that strategising and the dynamic strategic map remain in touch with the changing and true reality.

This systemic process from top to bottom, and from bottom to top as described above, finds its ultimate integration in an appropriate measurement model with its accompanying metrics (see Figure 5). The measurement model needs to reflect in an integrated fashion the real time performance of the organisation, strategically, tactically and operationally (Carlson, 1999:17-24; Doyle, 1999:169-189; Gay, 2005:5; Kaplan & Norton, 1996a, 1996b; McAdam & Bailie, 2002:972-996 and Robert, 2004). Real time measurement enables an ongoing strategic dialogue in the organisation, which keeps strategising alive, and the strategic map dynamically transforming as the daily coal face moments of truth provides feedback on the organisation's impact and clues about shifts in the organisation's setting.

Figure 5: Strategising as an everyday, ongoing living reality




Sustainable future value-add resulting from strategising hence is only attainable if a seamless strategising process, connecting the macro setting with its big picture changes and the operational setting with its ongoing coal face moments of truth, is institutionalised in an organisation. In turn, this process must be integrated with an appropriate real time measurement model with metrics. All of the above, in turn, must be embedded within the full repertoire of strategising acts and respective change states.

AN OVERALL STRATEGISING APPROACH SUITABLE FOR A HYPERTURBULENT AND HYPERFLUID WORLD

Based on the above discussion, an overall strategising approach more suitable to a hyperturbulent and hyperfluid world is suggested in Figure 6.

Figure 6: A proposed overall strategising approach suitable to a hyperturbulent and hyperfluid world



According to Figure 6, the suggested approach centers around ensuring sustainable future value-adding for stakeholders, the ultimate value-adding of strategising; requires an enabling change navigation strategy and plan; the performance of the full repertoire of strategising acts (i.e. exploration and direction setting, bonding and molding); strategising proper (i.e. from formulating an appropriate strategising logic through to building and rolling out a measurement model with metrics); and the strategising context made up of a seamless strategising-operating governance structure and process, and critical strategising enablers. Typically, conventional strategising's predominant focus is on strategic planning and the plan (the areas of craft the strategic map; strategic change waves; and measurement model in Figure 6). The other components depicted in Figure 6 receive no to little attention in conventional strategising. This approach to strategising has a low probability of success under conditions of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity, making strategising a lost cause and strategic fatigue a certainty.

MANAGERIAL/ORGANISATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED REINVENTED STRATEGISING

The above discussion offered an integrated, comprehensive reinvented strategising approach which is believed will contribute towards the continued viability of strategising under conditions of hyperturbulence and hyperfluidity, given strategising's increasingly critical role under these conditions. In meeting the respective success criteria to make strategising a viable endeavor, the proposed "new order" strategising would necessitate at least the following in terms of:

- *feasibility*: applying the complete repertoire of strategising acts, premised on an appropriate reality perspective, and enacted at the requisite complexity level;
- *appropriateness*: architecting a "fit-for-purpose" strategising logic;
- *synergy*: charting a strategic map to guide and direct the organisation into the future;
- *coherence*: viewing strategising and change navigation as two sides of the same coin; and
- *sustainability*: making strategising an everyday, ongoing reality in the organisation.

The above-proposed requirements for a re-invented strategising, and the suggested overall strategising approach based on these requirements, have the following implications:

- the requirements and approach integrate what currently is treated as separate discourses in the strategic literature. Management and organisations thus have an integrated view of strategising to work with;
- the requirements and approach reframe and/ or combine the strategising literature with the latest thinking regarding the nature and dynamics of the reality which needs to be strategised about and be transformed, e.g. complexity/ chaos theory and change navigation. This reframing and combination will assist management to work with a "truer" picture of reality; and
- all of the above may reduce the chances that management and organisations will suffer from strategic fatigue because strategising will become an everyday living reality in the organisation.

CONCLUSION

Strategising is not a lost cause in a hyperturbulent and hyperfluid world provided that strategising reinvents itself for such conditions. Indeed, ongoing strategising becomes even more important under these conditions. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, because the future will look different, and organisations in identity, positioning and operations therefore need to look and act differently in that future, strategising similarly has to reinvent itself to become more effective within this different future and transformed/transforming organisations. The requirements for a re-invented strategising, and the suggested overall strategising approach based on these requirements, have been proposed in order to make strategising future fit.

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